imre.agent
5603690a72
The "clean" baseline unintentionally shipped ~34 planted webshells/backdoors
plus sbtrack (a third-party SEO-cloaking proxy) and inert scanner probes,
carried in from the vetted-live Helix3 template. They survived because the IOC
safety net keyed on extension ('*.php.json') while the attacker disguised one
webshell under ~20 fake extensions (.inc.json/.phar.json/.php[3-5].json/
.php.json.json) plus plain-.json defacements.
- History rewritten (git filter-repo) to remove all 48 files from every commit.
- build-baseline.sh step 6 is now CONTENT-based: any templates/**/*.json with a
PHP open tag is dropped (legit Helix3 presets are pure JSON).
- malware-iocs.paths extended with plain-.json defacements, probe artifacts and
non-.json droppers a content grep cannot key on.
Found by the imrcli HIDS YARA union layer during baseline integration (the
baseline-diff alone would have marked them baseline-match).
Assisted-by: claude-code@claude-opus-4-8
106 lines
5.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
106 lines
5.0 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# build-baseline.sh — reproducibly assemble the www.archline.hu clean CODE baseline.
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#
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# Output (out/) = the deployed docroot (code only), which the operator's HIDS
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# baseline-diff verifies the live server against.
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#
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# The repo stores the baseline CONSTITUENTS, not the deployed tree; this script
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# performs the deterministic "deployment" (Joomla manifest-mapping for packaged
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# extensions, direct placement for no-source ones), per RUNBOOK.md.
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#
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# Usage: ./build-baseline.sh [OUT_DIR] (default: ./out)
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set -euo pipefail
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ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
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OUT="${1:-$ROOT/out}"
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log(){ printf '[build] %s\n' "$*"; }
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rm -rf "$OUT"; mkdir -p "$OUT"
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# Ensure the developer-controlled submodules are populated (cadcommonlib, maintenance).
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git -C "$ROOT" submodule update --init \
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cadline/backend/common_cadline_libraries cadline/backend/maintenance >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
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log "WARN: submodule update failed — common_cadline_libraries/maintenance may be empty"
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# 1) Joomla core — official 3.8.11 package (deployed form), minus demo assets and
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# runtime data dirs (cache/tmp/logs/images are data, not verified code).
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log "core: Joomla 3.8.11 (official package)"
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rsync -a \
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--exclude='/cache/' --exclude='/tmp/' --exclude='/logs/' \
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--exclude='/images/sampledata/' --exclude='/images/banners/' --exclude='/images/headers/' \
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--exclude='/images/joomla_black.png' --exclude='/images/powered_by.png' \
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"$ROOT/core/" "$OUT/"
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# 2) Upstream-package extensions — deployed-layout, byte-reconciled to live.
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# In git these are authored as two commits per modified module: (a) the
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# pristine upstream package manifest-mapped by lib/jmap.py, (b) the reconcile
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# to the live bytes (line-endings + install files + Cadline delta). `git diff`
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# between those two commits documents exactly how live differs from upstream.
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# At build time the reconciled (live-byte) deployed files are placed directly.
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for d in "$ROOT"/packages/*/; do
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[ -d "$d" ] || continue
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log "package: $(basename "$d")"
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rsync -a --exclude='.provenance' "$d" "$OUT/"
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done
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# 3) No-source extensions — vetted deployed files (no obtainable package),
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# placed directly (already in deployed layout).
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for d in "$ROOT"/deployed/*/; do
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[ -d "$d" ] || continue
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log "deployed: $(basename "$d")"
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rsync -a --exclude='.provenance' "$d" "$OUT/"
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done
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# 4) Cadline own-code (components/modules/plugins/templates/docroot apps).
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for d in "$ROOT"/cadline/*/; do
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[ -d "$d" ] || continue
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log "cadline: $(basename "$d")"
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rsync -a --exclude='.provenance' --exclude='.git' "$d" "$OUT/"
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done
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# 5) Cadline core modifications — live versions overlaid on the package core
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# (the ~24 legit customizations); the 3 trojanized core files stay clean.
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if [ -d "$ROOT/overrides" ]; then
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log "overrides: Cadline core modifications"
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rsync -a --exclude='.gitkeep' "$ROOT/overrides/" "$OUT/"
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fi
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# NOTE: common_cadline_libraries + maintenance come from the authoritative
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# developer submodules (cadcommonlib, maintenance) as-is. Their content currently
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# diverges from the live docroot (mixed line-endings + a content drift on
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# crm_hardlock.class.php / POfile.php) because live was not last deployed from the
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# submodule HEADs. The baseline reflects the authoritative repos; the HIDS flags
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# the live divergence until live is re-deployed or the drift is reconciled.
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# Line-ending normalization is intentionally left to the verifier, not applied here.
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# 6) Safety net — CONTENT-based malware exclusion. The constituent sources above
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# are vetted clean, but this catches a planted file regardless of its extension
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# disguise. The 2026 incident planted one webshell under ~20 fake extensions
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# (.inc.json / .phar.json / .php[3-5].json / .php.json.json) plus plain-.json
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# defacements — an extension allowlist (the old '*.php.json' filter) missed ALL
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# of them. The robust signal is CONTENT, not extension.
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log "exclude: content-based malware safety net"
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# (a) Any .json under templates/ carrying a PHP open tag is NOT a legit Helix3
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# layout preset (those are pure JSON) — it is a disguised dropper. This closes
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# the .json-disguise gap deterministically.
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if [ -d "$OUT/templates" ]; then
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find "$OUT/templates" -type f -name '*.json' 2>/dev/null | while IFS= read -r j; do
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if grep -Ilq -m1 -E '<\?php|<\?=' "$j" 2>/dev/null; then
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log " drop (php-in-json): ${j#"$OUT"/}"; rm -f "$j"
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fi
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done
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fi
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# (b) Legacy extension patterns (belt-and-suspenders; harmless if already gone).
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find "$OUT" \( -name '*.php.json' -o -name '*.phtml.json' -o -name 'h3x_*' -o -name '_h3x_*' \) -delete 2>/dev/null || true
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# (c) Explicit IOC path list (docroot-relative) — the plain-.json defacements,
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# probe artifacts and non-.json droppers that a content grep cannot key on.
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if [ -f "$ROOT/malware-iocs.paths" ]; then
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while IFS= read -r ioc; do
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[ -z "$ioc" ] && continue
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case "$ioc" in \#*) continue;; esac
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rm -rf "${OUT:?}/$ioc"
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done < "$ROOT/malware-iocs.paths"
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fi
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log "baseline built at: $OUT ($(find "$OUT" -type f | wc -l) files)"
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